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Funding to establish the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy has been provided by the Australian Government.
Lowy Institute Policy Briefs are designed to address a particular, current 
policy issue and to suggest solutions. They are deliberately prescriptive, 
specifically addressing two questions: What is the problem? What 
should be done?
The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and 
not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy nor of the G20 
Studies Centre.
The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international 
policy debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is 
not limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to:
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international 
debate.
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing 
an accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, 
dialogues and conferences.
3THE G20 NEEDS A GROWTH STRATEGYPOLICY BRIEF
THE G20 NEEDS A GROWTH 
STRATEGY
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
Restoring global economic growth and creating jobs has been an 
objective of successive G20 summits. Australia has also made it a 
priority for the G20 in 2014. To achieve such an outcome requires a 
comprehensive and agreed growth strategy. The G20 lacks such a 
strategy and has failed to provide a clear and consistent message about 
how members can or are working together to achieve such an outcome. 
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
G20 leaders outlined the way forward at the St Petersburg Summit in 
2013 when they asked finance ministers to develop  growth strategies for 
the Brisbane Summit. A single umbrella strategy, outlining how countries 
will work together to lift growth and create jobs, should be released 
at the Brisbane Summit. It should move away from the current focus 
on rebalancing global growth and embrace a plan for lifting potential 
growth in all countries. Accompanying this, each G20 member should 
release their own plan to increase growth in their country, consistent 
with the umbrella strategy. Leaders need to be directly involved and 
take ownership of the growth strategy. All aspects of policy need to be 
covered: fiscal, monetary, financial regulation, structural, tax, trade and 
development. To engage the public, draft growth strategies should be 
released for comment prior to the Brisbane Summit.
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DOES THE G20 HAVE A GROWTH STRATEGY?
At the heart of the G20 is a commitment by members to work together 
to restore global economic growth and create jobs. This has been 
repeatedly stated as the core objective of the G20 at successive 
summits. It comes as no surprise that a key theme under the Australian 
presidency in 2014 is to promote stronger economic growth and 
employment outcomes.1  A clear strategy is required to achieve these 
objectives, but it is far from clear that the G20 has one.
THE G20 FRAMEWORK AND THE MAP  
– AN AMBITIOUS INITIATIVE
The G20 initiative that was meant to encapsulate the cooperative 
effort to deliver better global economic outcomes is the Framework for 
Strong Sustainable and Balanced Growth (Framework), underpinned 
by the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP). These were launched at the 
Pittsburgh Summit in 2009.
This was a highly ambitious commitment to action-oriented and 
peer-driven international economic cooperation. Previous examples 
of significant international economic policy cooperation are limited. 
Exceptions include the 1978 G7 Bonn Summit, the 1985 Plaza 
Agreement and the 1987 Louvre Accord.2  Typically, instances of 
successful international economic cooperation have come at times 
of crisis, such as the 1987 stock market crash that saw G7 countries 
coordinate interest rate reductions as well as a boost to liquidity. More 
recently, the 2008 global financial crisis saw the G20 respond with 
a coordinated program of fiscal expansion, commitments to avoid 
protectionism, financial regulatory reform, and an increase in the 
resources of international financial institutions.
There are a number of reasons why macroeconomic policy cooperation 
is difficult in ‘normal’ times. Countries find it difficult to agree on the 
nature of their shared economic situation and on the impact of one 
country’s policies on others (the extent of spillovers). It may also seem 
that the costs associated with cooperation exceed the cost of the 
spillover.3  Often the economic policies of larger countries can have a 
significant negative impact on smaller countries, but because the gains 
from changing these policies might not be great for the larger countries, 
there is little incentive for them to cooperate. 
A purported strength of the G20 Framework is that it involves both the 
major advanced countries and emerging markets. However, this is also 
a weakness because it means negotiations have to overcome a greater 
diversity of interests compared with more like-minded organisations 
such as the G7. Nevertheless, a clear advantage of the Framework and 
MAP is that it is country-led, implying greater buy-in by G20 members. 
This is in contrast to IMF surveillance, which largely involves the IMF 
providing policy recommendations to Fund members. 
Previous examples of 
significant international 
economic policy 
cooperation are limited. 
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HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS THE G20 FRAMEWORK 
BEEN IN LIFTING GLOBAL GROWTH?
It is not easy to assess the success of the G20 Framework and the 
MAP, because it is not clear whether the global economy would be any 
different if there had not been a G20 Framework. Yet given that the 
objective of the G20 is to promote stronger, more sustainable and more 
balanced economic growth, the continuing sub-par performance of the 
global economy suggests that, at best, the achievements of the G20 
Framework have been modest. While the IMF has recently revised up its 
forecasts for the global economy for 2014, this follows six consecutive 
downward revisions (see Figure 1). Global GDP growth has remained 
weak since 2010.
As is evident in Figure 2, the recovery from the 2008 crisis has been 
more protracted than recoveries from previous recessions and output in 
many countries has still not returned to pre-crisis levels. 
Figure 1. IMF World Economic Outlook forecasts of global GDP growth4   
(Per cent growth) 
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Figure 3. G20 employment6  
(persons employed, millions)
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This weak economic growth has had an impact on labour market 
out ome  (Figure 3), with the ILO reporting that unemploym nt has 
increased by 28 million from 2007 to 2012 and has risen by a further 5.1 
million in 2013, to more than 202 million worldwide.
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It is also not clear that the existence of the Framework and the peer 
review process has actually influenced the policy choices of countries. 
Jonathan Ostry and Atish Ghosh from the IMF offer a negative view: 
  “While it is too soon to make a definitive assessment, evidence 
to date does not suggest that any of the large countries have 
made significant adjustments to their economic policies in 
response to peer pressure under the MAP”.7  
In addition, the joint resolve evident in the G20’s immediate response to 
the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 appears to have dissipated. 
As Ostry and Ghosh note: 
  “Incentives for collective action … seem to be waning now 
given the distance from the darkest days of the crisis, as well 
as political economy factors specific to each country/region and 
the multi-speed global recovery”. 8  
In recent years, the G20 has struggled to deliver a clear, consistent 
message as to how members are or should be cooperating to restore 
growth. The focus has been more on areas of disagreement than those 
of agreement, such as the debate over ‘growth versus stability’ or the 
impact of quantitative easing and concerns over currency wars. 
DEFICIENCIES IN THE FRAMEWORK AND THE MAP
A problem with the Framework and MAP is that their structure, operations 
and purpose were not sufficiently spelled out and agreed when they 
were launched. These issues have not been resolved in the course 
of the operation of the Framework and MAP. What constitutes strong, 
sustainable and balanced growth was never clarified. The Framework 
evolved on the basis of treating strong, sustainable and balanced 
growth as three separate objectives, rather than one objective with three 
components. The interconnections between policies and objectives were 
not sufficiently recognised. For example, rigorous fiscal consolidation 
was portrayed as necessary to achieve sustainable growth without taking 
into account the impact of such policies on growth in the short-term.
What constitutes ‘balanced’ growth remains particularly vague. Charged 
by G20 members to assess the consistency of member policies with 
the Framework, the IMF interpreted ‘balanced’ growth as broad-based 
growth across countries. There has, however, been an increasing 
tendency to see balanced growth as the reduction in current account 
imbalances. At a broader level, the aim of balanced growth could be 
seen as ensuring that all citizens benefit from stronger growth. This 
would encompass narrowing the development gap between countries 
and improving income inequality within countries. 
The MAP has evolved over time. At the outset, the focus was on shifting 
demand, both internally and externally, so that deficit and surplus 
“While it is too soon to 
make a definitive 
assessment, evidence 
to date does not suggest 
that any of the large 
countries have made 
significant adjustments to 
their economic policies in 
response to peer pressure 
under the MAP”.
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Figure 4. Current account imbalances10   
(Per cent of G20 GDP)
countries could adjust imbalances relatively smoothly and avoid a 
‘hole in demand’ if the deficit countries acted unilaterally. The aim was 
to ‘rebalance’ global growth. As the crisis abated and global growth 
appeared to be strengthening, more attention turned to medium-term 
fiscal consolidation. However, at the Seoul Summit in 2010, the focus of 
the MAP was very much on reducing external imbalances. Following a 
poorly received attempt to pursue a target in relation to current account 
imbalances, the compromise was an agreement to develop ‘indicative 
indicators’ to identify members with imbalances that required further 
assessment. As Hamid Faruqee and Krishna Srinivasan have observed, 
this shift in the MAP away from shared growth objectives to a focus on 
external sustainability may have ‘in retrospect derailed fledging buy-in by 
key surplus countries’.9  Nevertheless, this is an area where there has 
been progress, with a significant reduction in external imbalances since 
the crisis, as evident in Figure 4.
It is not clear, however, whether this reduction in imbalances has 
been due to temporary factors, particularly a weakness in demand, or 
a more permanent change. The IMF believes it reflects both. Part of 
the adjustment has been healthy, reflecting the correction of financial 
excesses that existed prior to the crisis as well as some demand 
rebalancing in key emerging surplus economies.11  In particular, China’s 
current account deficit has fallen from 10 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 
around 2.5 per cent in 2013. 
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...the G20 needs a 
growth strategy that 
moves beyond a focus 
on reducing external 
imbalances to embrace 
the importance of lifting 
potential growth. 
The IMF notes, however, that part of the adjustment also comes from 
low internal demand in advanced deficit economies.12  Nevertheless, 
the IMF foresees a largely durable narrowing in global imbalances. 
13  Whether large external imbalances re-emerge depends on the 
size of countries’ output gaps (the extent to which current growth is 
below potential growth). The IMF’s assessment is that output gaps in 
advanced economies are not large, consistent with the evidence that 
large financial crises tend to involve durable losses in the level of output 
relative to pre-crisis trends. Hence, the Fund’s forecast is that as output 
gaps close, global imbalances will move sideways. If correct, this 
means that while global imbalances may decline, growth will remain 
at rates below pre-crisis levels. Consequently, the G20 needs a growth 
strategy that moves beyond a focus on reducing external imbalances to 
embrace the importance of lifting potential growth. 
Another important deficiency in the MAP is that not all the priority reforms 
needed to foster growth are covered. Comparing the policy commitments 
identified in the St Petersburg Action Plan with the policy recommendations 
contained in the most recent IMF Article IV (surveillance) reports for G20 
members, there are some overlaps, but many gaps. Moreover, a report 
on the G20 structural reform commitments prepared by the OECD and 
the World Bank notes that there is limited overlap in the reforms contained 
in the St Petersburg commitments with the top five country-specific policy 
priorities outlined by the OECD in its Going for Growth exercise.14  The 
OECD and World Bank conclude:
  “the moderate degree of overlap between the G20 and OECD 
Going for Growth priorities suggest some scope for identifying 
commitments that are more favourable for growth than current 
commitments”.15
In the absence of any enforcement mechanism, the main incentive 
for compliance of commitments made under the Framework is 
domestic public pressure. But for this to happen, the action plans 
and accountability assessments prepared in the G20 process have 
to get public recognition. There is no evidence that this is happening. 
This is not surprising. The St Petersburg Action Plan and supporting 
documentation was 187 pages long. It was technical, repetitive and 
conveyed no clear messages. No leader, or likely any G20 minister, 
would have even read this material in full. 
THE PATH TO A COMPREHENSIVE ‘G20 GROWTH 
STRATEGY’
The G20 needs a clear, consistent and comprehensive narrative to 
explain to the public how countries are cooperating on their respective 
policies to lift growth and create jobs. It needs a clear ‘growth strategy’. 
How can this be achieved? It will not come from the way in which the 
Framework and the MAP have developed to date. 
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Leaders outlined a way forward at St Petersburg when they requested 
their finance ministers to develop “comprehensive growth strategies 
for presentation to the Brisbane summit”.16  Australia has said this 
commitment would be “encapsulated in a Brisbane Action Plan” 
and would include “practical actions to improve productivity and 
competitiveness, strengthen investment in infrastructure, encourage 
trade, make it easier to do business and boost employment”. 17  
This broadening of the policy focus is welcome, but the proposed 
approach raises concerns that the problems that are evident with 
the Framework and the MAP will be repeated. The desire to identify 
‘practical actions’ or ‘concrete commitments’ to demonstrate progress 
is understandable. But it is important to make sure that is not at the 
expense of having first developed a comprehensive and agreed 
strategy on how to strengthen growth and create jobs. The specific 
policy measures should be presented as part of the implementation 
of a coherent strategy. Another 187 page ‘action plan’ that mainly lists 
the policy measures that countries are already implementing or have 
already announced outside of the G20 process will not constitute a 
coherent growth strategy. 
The ‘growth strategy’ has to be more than rhetoric. The challenge is to 
get agreement on the direction of policies, and in particular cooperation 
between individual country measures that are required to promote 
growth. Getting agreement on a meaningful growth strategy will be 
hard, but it is vital.
If the Brisbane Summit is to strengthen the Framework and the MAP, 
and ensure that the G20 has a clear ‘growth strategy’, it should take the 
following steps:
• An ‘umbrella’ G20 growth strategy should be released at the 
Brisbane Summit, outlining how G20 countries are working together 
to lift growth. Alongside the umbrella G20 growth strategy, each G20 
member should release its individual growth strategy, which 
outlines its plan for increasing growth, consistent with the umbrella 
strategy. A separate Brisbane Action Plan can provide the detailed 
measures that countries are implementing as well as the accountability 
assessments. But this should also be a concise document. 
• The G20 growth strategy should move away from the current MAP 
focus on rebalancing global growth, and embrace a plan for lifting 
potential growth in all countries – advanced, emerging and 
developing. This would recognise that the prolonged nature of the 
financial crisis has lowered potential growth in many countries. If the 
IMF is correct and output gaps have narrowed, growth will not return 
to pre-crisis levels. The challenge is to raise potential growth in all G20 
countries. This will require structural measures. It will not be achieved 
with fiscal expansion or accommodating monetary policy alone.
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• Lifting potential growth will require a plan that incorporates all 
aspects of policy – fiscal, monetary, financial regulation, structural, 
tax, trade and development. While many of these issues have 
been on the G20 agenda, they have been considered in isolation 
and have not been part of the MAP, which has largely focused on 
counter-cyclical macroeconomic management. The G20 needs a 
comprehensive growth strategy.
• The strategy should be concise but it must go beyond rhetoric. 
The difficult issues and risks should be confronted and the 
strategic priorities for the coming year highlighted. For example, 
the growth strategy should move beyond such statements as those 
in the St Petersburg Action Plan that “advanced G20 countries 
agree to maintain a flexible approach in implementing their fiscal 
strategies” and “we remain mindful of the risks and unintended 
negative side effects of extended periods of monetary easing”.18 
These are words designed to cover a variety of competing views. 
The growth strategy must explicitly acknowledge that the aim is to 
rebalance the macroeconomic policy mix by reducing the need to 
rely on accommodative monetary policy in order to offset the drag 
on growth from fiscal consolidation. The growth strategy should 
also acknowledge such risks as the dangers of deflation and the 
importance of avoiding the premature withdrawal of monetary 
support, along with the potential capital volatility that could come 
with the unwinding of quantitative easing. 
• Increasing investment, including in particular infrastructure 
investment (both publicly and privately funded), is central to lifting 
potential growth. Labour and capital inputs, along with how efficiently 
they are used, are the drivers of economic growth. But the focus 
should always be on lifting high quality infrastructure investment 
that will contribute to a sustainable increase in growth and not just 
increasing investment for a short-term boost in demand. Improving 
the efficiency of existing infrastructure should also be included as 
part of the growth plan. The challenges countries face in raising 
high quality investment will vary, and accordingly, there will need to 
be country-specific solutions. These should be highlighted in each 
member’s growth strategy.
• As noted, fostering economic growth will require increasing the supply 
and quality of labour inputs. Consequently, effective labour market 
programs and policies to increase skills and participation must be 
key components of the growth strategy. In addition, the importance 
of liberalising product markets and facilitating competition along 
with greater private sector investment should be highlighted in the 
growth strategy.
• Dealing with inequality has to be part of each country’s strategy 
to achieve stable and sustainable growth. As IMF research has 
Lifting potential growth 
will require a plan that 
incorporates all aspects 
of policy 
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highlighted, rising inequality is linked with greater economic 
instability. Focusing on achieving inclusive growth is also important 
in gaining public support for reform initiatives.
• It is essential that countries focus on the highest priority reforms 
needed to lift growth potential. Towards this end, countries should 
commit to tackling the priority reforms recommended by the OECD 
and other international bodies.
• One of the challenges is demonstrating how G20 members are 
cooperating to strengthen growth, given that many of the required 
policy measures are largely domestic. The answer is to highlight 
areas in the growth strategy where international cooperation is vital. 
Such areas include advancing multilateral trade liberalisation, 
dealing with tax evasion and avoidance, and regulating banks 
that operate globally. With respect to trade, the strategy should 
highlight the key areas where members need to work together to 
expand international trade – such as strengthening the standstill 
against protection, removing barriers for trade in services, expanding 
the WTO Information Technology Agreement and promoting greater 
compatibility between regional trade arrangements and the WTO 
rules. Similarly, the growth strategy should note the existing focus 
of G20 members on combating tax evasion and avoidance and on 
strengthening the stability of financial systems.
• Leaders need to be directly involved and should take ownership 
of the G20 growth strategy. The lead will have to come from the chair, 
the Australian prime minister. Most importantly, preparing a growth 
strategy should not be left to officials and confined to the Framework 
Working Group. The growth strategy should not be absorbed into 
the Brisbane Action Plan. It is important to first have a clear strategy 
before getting into the detail of specific measures. This has been a 
problem with the way the Framework has developed to date.
• The intended audience for the G20 growth strategy should be the 
domestic populations of each G20 member. The current G20 
action plans are technical exercises that receive no public airing. 
As a result there is little or no pressure on member governments to 
implement them. The G20 needs a clear narrative that explains to 
its citizens how members are cooperating to lift growth and create 
jobs. This will in turn create domestic pressure on member states to 
implement their commitments under the strategy. The draft umbrella 
strategy and each member’s individual growth strategies should 
be released for public comment prior to the Brisbane Summit. 
Public scrutiny of a draft strategy will help ensure that they are 
meaningful documents.
Dealing with inequality 
has to be part of each 
country’s strategy to 
achieve stable and 
sustainable growth. 
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CONCLUSION
The G20 has made impressive contributions to global economic 
governance, particularly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
Today, however, its relevance is increasingly being questioned. As 
the only international grouping that brings together developed and 
developing countries it is important that the forum is effective. But it 
can only do so if it demonstrates its relevance to addressing the key 
problems facing the global economy. Formulating a meaningful strategy 
for increasing economic growth and creating jobs is essential to the 
future of the G20. As chair in 2014 Australia should lead that effort. It 
will not be easy but at this stage in the G20’s evolution it is essential. 
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